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SECURING PERSONAL JURISDICTION OVER
NONRESIDENTS IN SPOUSAL AND CHILD
SUPPORT SUITS: IS CALIFORNIA'S
LONG-ARM TOO SHORT?*
This Comment examines California's approach to long-arm ju-
risdiction in familial support suits. The author suggests that
California's courts have failed to consider adequately the full
panoply of interests which bear on the constitutionality of exer-
cising jurisdiction over nonresidents for support. Consequently,
the reach of California's long-arm statute has been unduly re-
stricted. As a solution, the author proposes a new 'familial rela-
tionship" basis for jurisdiction in support actions.
INTRODUCTION
Before a state may adjudicate personal rights flowing from a
marital relationship, it must have personal jurisdiction over the
parties.' Thus, a wife may not secure a valid support order for
herself or her children unless she finds a court with personal ju-
risdiction over her husband.2 Unfortunately, personal jurisdiction
may prove difficult to obtain. As a consequence of the marriage
breakdown, one or both spouses may have taken up residence far
from the marital domicile.3 The defendant spouse may even have
obtained an ex parte divorce in a distant state in a deliberate at-
tempt to avoid any support obligations.4
* The author would like to express his grateful appreciation to Professor
Darrell Bratton for his valuable assistance in the preparation of this Comment.
1. Vanderbilt v. Vanderbilt, 354 U.S. 416 (1957); Estin v. Estin, 334 U.S. 541
(1948).
2. Of course, California recognizes an obligation of support in both spouses.
CAL. CIV. CODE § 5132 (West 1979). As a practical matter, however, suits by hus-
bands for support remain uncommon. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Higgason, 10 Cal.
3d 476, 487, 516 P.2d 289, 296, 110 Cal. Rptr. 897, 904 (1973).
3. See, e.g., Knowles, Expanding Jurisdiction over Domestic Relations
Causes, 11 J. FPA. L. 49, 53 (1971); Comment, Long-Arm Jurisdiction in Alimony
and Custody Cases, 73 COLUM. L. REV. 289, 290 (1973).
4. A marriage can be dissolved without personal jurisdiction over the re-
sponding party as long as the suit is filed at the petitioner's domicile. Williams v.
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In response to this problem, many states have enacted specially
tailored long-arm statutes authorizing service of process on non-
resident defendants in spousal and child support suits.5 Typi-
cally, these statutes only authorize jurisdiction when the
defendant's contacts with the state satisfy certain criteria, such as
the maintenance of a matrimonial domicile6 or the conception of a
child7 within the state. In contrast, California has relied since
1970 on a single, all-inclusive long-arm statute containing no spe-
cific factual prerequisites to the state's exercise of jurisdiction
over nonresidents. Section 410.10 of the Code of Civil Procedure
simply provides that California's courts "may exercise jurisdic-
tion on any basis not inconsistent with the Constitution of [Cali-
fornia] or of the United States." 8
Ten years have seen only a handful of challenges to California's
broad jurisdictional mandate in the context of familial support lit-
igation.9 Nonetheless, a disturbing trend is apparent. California's
courts have made no effort to carve out an approach to long-arm
jurisdiction in domestic relations suits that reflects the special
considerations of policy inherent in this area of the law. The
courts have relied instead on doctrines derived from cases involv-
ing corporate defendants or arm's-length transactions between in-
dividuals. References to policy or the special nature of
intrafamily lawsuits have been infrequent and superficial.
This Comment will suggest that California's courts revise their
approach to long-arm jurisdiction in support actions. After a brief
review of basic jurisdictional principles, the Comment explores
North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287 (1942). Personal obligations survive the ex parte di-
vorce, however, and may be asserted later by the respondent if he or she can
somehow acquire personal jurisdiction over the delinquent spouse. Vanderbilt v.
Vanderbilt, 354 U.S. 416 (1957); Estin v. Estin, 334 U.S. 541 (1948). California
adopted this "divisible divorce" theory in Hudson v. Hudson, 52 Cal. 2d 735, 344
P.2d 295 (1959). See also Weber v. Superior Court, 53 Cal. 2d 403, 348 P.2d 572, 2
Cal. Rptr. 9 (1960); Comment, State Law Problems in Adopting the Divisible Di-
vorce Theory, 12 STAN. L REV. 848 (1960).
5. See, e.g., IDAHO CODE § 5-514 (1979); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110, § 17 (Smith-
Hurd Supp. 1979); NEV. REV. STAT. § 14.065 (1973); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1701.03
(West Supp. 1979); TEx. FAm. CODE ANN. §§ 3.26, 11.051 (Vernon Supp. 1978).
6. See, e.g., IDAHo CODE § 5-514 (1979); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110, § 17 (Smith-
Hurd Supp. 1979).
7. See, e.g., TEX. FAm. CODE ANN. § 11.051 (Vernon Supp. 1978).
8. CAL. CIV. PRoc. CODE § 410.10 (West 1973).
9. Only six such cases have reached the appellate level since Code of Civil
Procedure § 410.10 was adopted in 1970. See Kulko v. Superior Court, 19 Cal. 3d
514, 564 P.2d 353, 138 Cal. Rptr. 586 (1977), rev'd, 436 U.S. 84 (1978); In re Marriage
of Lontos, 89 Cal. App. 3d 61, 152 Cal. Rptr. 271 (1979); Bartlett v. Superior Court, 86
Cal. App. 3d 72, 150 Cal. Rptr. 25 (1978); Hoerler v. Superior Court, 85 Cal. App. 3d
533, 149 Cal. Rptr. 569 (1978); Judd v. Superior Court, 60 Cal. App. 3d 38, 131 Cal.
Rptr. 246 (1976); Titus v. Superior Court, 23 Cal. App. 3d 792, 100 Cal. Rptr. 477
(1972).
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the unique considerations of policy that inhere in domestic rela-
tions litigation. It then analyzes the current California approach.
Finally, in an effort to afford desirable consistency and predict-
ability to jurisdictional decision-making in this area of the law,
the Comment formulates a new basis for jurisdiction specifically
tailored to spousal and child support suits.
JURISDICTION: SATISFYING DUE PROCESS
The permissible scope of state jurisdiction is determined by the
due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. The contours of
due process, however, are vague. Russell Weintraub has sug-
gested that the core concept is simply "reasonableness."' 0 This
was the standard adopted by the Supreme Court in International
Shoe Co. v. Washington." "[The demands of due process] may
be met by such contacts ... with the state of the forum as make
it reasonable, in the context of our federal system of government,
to require [the defendant] to defend the particular suit which is
brought here."1 2 International Shoe has since been enshrined in
the law as the "minimum contacts" test for jurisdiction, the Court
having noted that jurisdiction must be based on "certain mini-
mum contacts with [the state] such that the maintenance of the
suit does not offend 'traditional notions of fair play and substan-
tial justice.' "13
In subsequent cases the Court has attempted to lend more rig-
orous definition to the due process test. For example, in McGee v.
International Life Insurance Co. ,14 a suit by the beneficiary of an
insurance policy against a nonresident insurer, the Court noted
that modern developments in transportation and communication
have "made it much less burdensome for a party sued to defend
himself in a State where he engages in economic activity."' 5 In
McGee, the defendant insurance company's contacts with the fo-
rum were minimal; it had no office or agent in the state and, ex-
cept for the contract sued upon, it had done no business there.16
10. R. WEINTRAUB, COMMENTARY ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 71 (1971). See also
Currie, The Growth of the Long Arm: Eight Years of Extended Jurisdiction in Illi-
nois, 1963 U. ILL. L. F. 533, 535 ("fairness").
11. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
12. Id. at 317.
13. Id. at 316 (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)).
14. 355 U.S. 220 (1957).
15. Id. at 223.
16. Id. at 222.
Nevertheless, the Court upheld jurisdiction over the company,
stressing the vulnerability of the plaintiff and the forum state's in-
terest "in providing effective means of redress for its residents
when their insurers refuse to pay claims.' 7
A year later, in Hanson v. Denckla,18 the Court emphasized a
"give and take" approach to long-arm jurisdiction. Hanson in-
volved a suit by the executrix of an estate against a foreign trust
company. The defendant, a Delaware corporation, had entered
into a trust agreement with the plaintiffs testatrix, who was then
a resident of Pennsylvania.19 The settlor subsequently moved to
Florida. The only contacts the defendant had with Florida there-
after consisted of letters and payments to the settlor. The trustee
did not transact any business in the state.20 In rejecting Florida's
claim of jurisdiction over the trustee ifi a suit based on the trust,
the Court stated:
The unilateral activity of those who claim some relationship with a non-
resident defendant cannot satisfy the requirement of contact with the fo-
rum State. The application of that rule will vary with the quality and
nature of the defendant's activity, but it is essential in each case that
there be some act by which the defendant purposefully avails itself of the
privilege of conducting activities within the forum State, thus invoking the
benefits and protections of its laws.2 1
Although this ',purposeful availment" test arose in the context of
a business transaction involving a corporate defendant, it has
been widely applied to cases involving individuals and non-com-
mercial dealings.22
Language in another Supreme Court case, Shaffer v. Heitner,2 3
has been viewed by commentators as providing a further refine-
ment to the International Shoe standard.24 In holding that the
17. Id. at 223. McGee established what has been called the "high-water mark"
for due process limitations on long-arm jurisdiction. R. WEINTRAuB, supra note 10,
at 88. Language in subsequent Supreme Court opinions has been more restrictive.
Indeed, in all of the personal jurisdiction cases which have reached the Supreme
Court since 1958, jurisdiction has been found lacking, prompting one commentator
to suggest that the Court has established as a priority the "imposition of effective
limits on state court exercises of jurisdiction." Nordenberg, State Courts, Personal
Jurisdiction and the Evolutionary Process, 54 NOTRE DAME LAw. 587, 588 (1979).
18. 357 U.S. 235 (1958).
19. Id. at 238.
20. Id. at 251-52.
21. Id. at 253.
22. California courts, in particular, have liberally applied the Hanson stan-
dard. See, e.g., Kulko v. Superior Court, 19 Cal. 3d 514, 564 P.2d 353, 138 Cal. Rptr.
586 (1977), rev'd, 436 U.S. 84 (1978) (child support suit); Sibley v. Superior Court,
16 Cal. 3d 442, 546 P.2d 322, 128 Cal. Rptr. 34 (1976) (individual defendant); Corne-
lison v. Chaney, 16 Cal. 3d 143, 545 P.2d 264, 127 Cal. Rptr. 352 (1976) (individual
defendant); Hoerler v. Superior Court, 85 Cal. App. 3d 533, 149 Cal. Rptr. 569 (1978)
(support suit). See also text accompanying notes 140-44 infra.
23. 433 U.S. 186 (1977).
24. See, e.g., Fischer, State Interests, Minimum Contacts, and In Personam Ju-
risdiction Under Code of Civil Procedure Section 410.10, 12 U.S.F. L. REv. 387
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nonresident directors and officers of a Delaware corporation did
not, solely by virtue of their stock ownership, have sufficient con-
tacts with Delaware to warrant its exercise of jurisdiction over
them, the Court stressed the importance of a defendant's ability
to foresee a potential suit in the forum.25
Distillation of these Supreme Court opinions yields three broad
indicia of reasonableness: the nature and extent of the forum's
interest in the litigation,26 the purposefulness of the defendant's
conduct,27 and the foreseeability of a suit in the forum.28 Other
factors which have been considered by the lower courts include
the number of contacts the defendant has with the forum,29 the
(1978); Woods, Pennoyer's Demise; Personal Jurisdiction After Shaffer and Kulko
and a Modest Prediction Regarding World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 20
ARIz. L. REV. 863 (1978).
25. [A]ppelants had no reason to expect to be haled before a Delaware
court. Delaware, unlike some States, has not enacted a statute that treats
acceptance of a directorship as consent to jurisdiction in the State. And
"[ilt strains reason ... to suggest that anyone buying securities in a cor-
poration formed in Delaware 'impliedly consents' to subject himself to
Delaware's ... jurisdiction on any cause of action."
Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 216 (1977) (quoting Folk & Moyer, Sequestration in
Delaware: A Constitutional Analysis, 73 COLUM. L REV. 749, 785 (1973)) (footnote
omitted).
Shaffer extended the minimum contacts standard of International Shoe to quasi
in rem actions, thus eliminating attachment of a nonresident's property as a
means of local redress when personal jurisdiction would not lie. See also Rush v.
Savchuk, 100 S. Ct 571 (1980), where the Court followed Shaffer in rejecting an ef-
fort by Minnesota to exercise quasi in rem jurisdiction over a nonresident who
had no contacts with Minnesota. Minnesota had tried attaching the contractual
obligation of the defendant's liability insurer which was licensed to do business in
the state. For commentary on the significance of Shaffer for long-arm jurisdiction
in support suits, see Weintraub, Texas Long-Arm Jurisdiction in Family Law
Cases, 32 Sw. L. J. 965, 970 (1978).
26. McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957).
27. Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958).
28. Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977). See also World-Wide Volkswagen
Corp. v. Woodson, 100 S. Ct. 559 (1980):
The protection against inconvenient litigation is typically described in
terms of 'reasonableness" or "fairness". . . . Implicit in this emphasis on
reasonableness is the understanding that the burden on the defendant,
while always a primary concern, will in an appropriate case be considered
in light of other relevant factors, including the forum State's interest in
adjudicating the dispute ... ; the plaintiffs interest in obtaining corive-
nient and effective relief..., at least when that interest is not adequately
protected by the plaintiff's power to choose the forum... ; the interstatejudicial system's interest in obtaining the most efficient resolution of con-
troversies; and the shared interest of the several States in furthering fun-
damental substantive social policies....
Id. at 564.
29. See, e.g., Erlanger Mills, Inc. v. Cohoes Fibre Mills, Inc., 239 F.2d 502 (4th
extent to which the cause of action is connected to the forum,30
the relative inconvenience of suit in the forum,31 the availability
of an alternative forum, 32 and forum conveniens concepts such as
the presence of evidence 33 or the convenience of witnesses.34
All of these considerations have quite naturally become a part
of California's jurisdictional formula, since the range of Califor-
nia's long-arm statute is commensurate with the limits of due pro-
cess. It may be worth noting, however, that most of these
jurisdictional principles were developed in tort or contract suits.
Indeed, the three Supreme Court cases discussed above involved
tort or contract actions against corporate defendants 35 or arms-
length transactions between individuals.36 To the extent that ju-
risdictional reasonableness also depends on the unique character-
istics of the area of law involved,37 rigid adherence in a support
suit to doctrines derived from these or other functionally dissimi-
lar cases would be misplaced. A better approach would be to
adapt these jurisdictional constructs to reflect the considerations
of policy inherent in domestic relations cases. In principle, this
would allow the courts to estimate more accurately the reasona-
bleness of exercising jurisdiction over nonresident defendants in
Cir. 1956) (one contact insufficient). But see McGee v. International Life Ins. Co.,
355 U.S. 220 (1957) (one contact sufficient).
30. See, e.g., Fisher Governor Co. v. Superior Court, 53 Cal. 2d 222, 347 P.2d 1, 1
Cal. Rptr. 1 (1959) (defendant must have greater connection with the forum if
cause of action is not connected with the state).
31. See, e.g., Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Schmitt, 441 F. Supp. 440 (N.D. Cal. 1977).
32. See, e.g., Empire Abrasive Equip. Corp. v. H.H. Watson, Inc., 567 F.2d 554
(3d Cir. 1977).
33. See, e.g., Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Schmitt, 441 F. Supp. 440 (N.D. Cal. 1977).
34. See, e.g., Ashe v. Pepsico, Inc., 443 F. Supp. 84 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
35. Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958); McGee v. International Life Ins.
Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957).
36. Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977). Actually, with one exception, all of
the Supreme Court's significant pronouncements on personal jurisdiction since In-
ternational Shoe have involved corporate defendants or arm's-length transactions
between individuals. See, e.g., Rush v. Savchuk, 100 S. Ct. 571 (1980) (tort suit be-
tween unrelated individuals); World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 100 S.
Ct. 559 (1980) (corporate defendant); Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977) (share-
holders' derivative suit against nonresident corporate officers); Hanson v. Denckla,
357 U.S. 235 (1958) (suit by the executrix of an estate against a foreign trust com-
pany); McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957) (corporate defend-
ant); Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437 (1952) (corporate
defendant); Travelers Health Ass'n v. Virginia, 339 U.S. 643 (1950) (corporate de-
fendant); International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945) (corporate de-
fendant). The exception, Kulko v. Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84 (1978), dealt with
jurisdiction in a child support suit. Because the Kulko opinion is of special import
for the thesis of this Comment, it will be discussed separately. See text accompa-
nying notes 107-21 infra.
37. See, e.g., Comment, Limited Jurisdiction in California: The Long-Arm of
the Law Reaches Farther in Tort than in Contract, 17 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 919
(1977).
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support actions. As a practical matter, such an approach would
normally lead to expanded assertions of state court jurisdiction,
because domestic relations disputes embody policies that make
personal jurisdiction over nonresidents desirable, even when the
defendant's contacts with the forum do not fall comfortably
within the traditional framework for territorial due process.38
POLICY CONSIDERATIONS
There are several considerations of policy which suggest that
state court jurisdiction might constitutionally extend farther in
support actions than in suits in contract or tort. These include
the migratory American lifestyle, the special vulnerability of chil-
dren, the intimacy of the parent-child relationship, and the state's
interest in providing a forum for potentially indigent residents.3 9
Conversely, there are other factors which indicate that an expan-
sion of jurisdiction in support suits might be unwarranted. For
example, all fifty states have adopted provisions for the reciprocal
enforcement of support decrees.40 These provisions facilitate the
prosecution of support claims against nonresidents with a mini-
mum of inconvenience to both plaintiff and defendant. Moreover,
any significant relaxation of the due process limitation on state
court jurisdiction might impair the states' ability to protect their
judicial systems from forum shopping.41 The extent to which any
of these considerations is implicated in a given situation will vary.
In support suits, however, a careful weighing of the competing
factors will generally tip the balance in favor of expanding juris-
diction.
We live in an increasingly mobile society. Tremendous ad-
vances have been made in communication and transportation
since International Shoe was decided in 1945.42 Moreover, as the
Supreme Court has often noted, these developments have consid-
erably lessened the burden on the defendant of defending in a
38. See text accompanying notes 39-81 infra.
39. See text accompanying notes 42-60 infra.
40. See UNIFORM RECIPROCAL ENFORCEMENT OF SUPPORT ACT (1950 version),
Commissioner's Prefatory Note, 9A UNinoRm LAws ANN. 748 (West 1979).
41. See text accompanying notes 61-63 infra.
42. See, e.g., World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 100 S. Ct. 580, 585-86
n.13 (1980) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citing statistics). Justice Brennan noted that
from 1945 to 1976 the number of revenue passenger miles flown (both domestic
and international) increased from 450 million to 179 billion, while automobile vehi-
cle-miles driven in the United States increased from 250 billion to 1,409 billion. Id.
distant forum. 43 Because the magnitude of the defendant's bur-
den is of "primary concern" in evaluating jurisdictional reasona-
bleness,44 this trend suggests that jurisdiction might safely be
expanded without violating due process. Indeed, one member of
the Court has suggested that the Court's emphasis on the extent
of the defendant's contacts with the forum may no longer be justi-
fied.45
Several commentators have voiced concern about the effect of
the migratory American lifestyle on the legal obligations flowing
from the marital relationship.46 As a consequence of increased
personal mobility and, perhaps, the expansion in career opportu-
nities for women, the dissolution of a marriage now often occa-
sions a departure from the marital domicile by both partners. In
the event one spouse thereafter repudiates his or her support ob-
ligations, conventional contacts with the state of the obligee's res-
idence may be inconsequential. Personal jurisdiction would
therefore seldom lie at the plaintiffs new home, even though the
burden of defending there might be no greater than the burden of
defending at the abandoned marital domicile, where the defend-
ant's contacts normally would be sufficient to sustain service of
process. Under these circumstances the plaintiff would be forced
to sue either at the defendant's new residence or at the former
marital domicile. Thus, in the context of domestic relations litiga-
tion, modern developments in transportation have not only de-
creased the burden of defending a long distance support suit;
they have increased the likelihood that, in the event of litigation,
the dependent spouse (the party least able to bear the financial
strain) will have to shoulder the cost and inconvenience of suit in
a foreign state.47
43. See, e.g., World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 100 S. Ct. 559, 565
(1980); Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 251 (1958); McGee v. International Life Ins.
Co., 355 U.S. 220, 223 (1957).
44. See World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 100 S. Ct. 559, 564 (1980).
45. Id. at 581 (Brennan, J., dissenting). See also Nordenberg, State Courts,
Personal Jurisdiction and the Evolutionary Process, 54 NOTRE DAME LAw. 587, 614
(1979):
[S]ince modern transportation and communication have largely blunted
defendant's claims of inconvenience, the continued vitality of the mini-
mum contacts test itself is called into question. The defendant's ties to
the forum state may no longer be crucial, or even very important, in ascer-
taining whether or not the fourteenth amendment's test of fairness has
been met.
46. See, e.g., Knowles, Expanding Jurisdiction over Domestic Relations
Causes, 11 J. FAm. L. 49, 53 (1971); Comment, Long-Arm Jurisdiction in Alimony
and Custody Cases, 73 COLurm. L. REV. 289, 290 (1973).
47. It may be of significance to California courts that the effects of migratory
divorces are likely to be enhanced in a "sunbelt" state like California, since
thousands of people flock to the warm climate of the west coast every year. Cali-
fornia experienced a net immigration of 2,930,000 people between 1960 and 1977,
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The potential inconvenience of litigating a support claim in a
distant state takes on a special poignancy when children are in-
volved. A child occupies a uniquely vulnerable position in the
law. He cannot sue to enforce a support agreement or to increase
the parental obligation as inflation or changed circumstances take
their toll. He must rely on his guardian to bring suit for him. To
the extent that litigation may be inconvenient or costly because
jurisdiction over the defendant parent cannot be obtained in the
state of the child's residence, the custodial parent's motivation to
sue will be decreased. If he or she decides not to bother with the
lawsuit, it is the innocent child who suffers.
This immediately distinguishes a child support action from
other types of litigation in which the plaintiff has a personal mon-
etary stake. The pro-defendant due process bias is clearly justifia-
ble when the plaintiff stands to gain by the lawsuit. It seems less
so when the nominal plaintiff has no personal stake in the out-
come and the party whose interests are actually being litigated is
helpless or incompetent.4 8 Indeed, treating a child support suit
like a conventional suit for a money judgment may be theoreti-
cally unsound because it implies that the child will be adequately
cared for and the suit is only a contest to see who must pay. Al-
though most states recognize an obligation of support in both par-
ents,49 in reality the complaining spouse is often indigent, or
nearly so. Thus, once a jurisdictional question is raised, the suit
becomes a contest to see whether anyone will pay.
Viewed in this light, a different approach seems warranted.
When the plaintiff sues on behalf of another who is unable to as-
bringing the population of the nation's most populous state to nearly 22,000,000.
BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT
OF THE UNITED STATES 15-16 (1978). See also Abel, Barry, Halstead & Marsh, Rights
of a Surviving Spouse in Property Acquired by a Decedent While Domiciled
Outside California, 47 CAL. L. REV. 211, 211 (1959).
48. If the suit is meritorious, the plaintiff will find it worthwhile to initiate liti-
gation away from home. Conversely, if the suit lacks substance, the plaintiff will
be unlikely to pursue it when to do so would involve the cost and inconvenience of
travelling to a distant forum. Vexatious litigation is discouraged if any inconve-
nience of the forum falls on the one who brings the suit. Thus, the pro-defendant
due process bias serves as a safeguard against lawsuits brought merely to harass,
but does not unduly interfere with the prosecution of legitimate claims, at least
when the plaintiff is motivated to pursue his or her claim by the prospect of per-
sonal gain. Absent such motivation, the pro-defendant bias may work an injustice
by discouraging the bringing of legitimate but inconvenient claims.
49. See Freed & Foster, Divorce in the Fifty States: An Overview as of 1978, 13
FAM. L. Q. 105 (1979).
sert his interests, determination of the reasonableness of exercis-
ing jurisdiction for purposes of due process might better be made
by balancing the interests and circumstances of the real opposing
parties. In a child support suit this involves contrasting the lim-
ited mobility and resources of the child with those of the delin-
quent parent, and suggests that the scale might properly be
tipped toward the former.50
There exists another important difference between child sup-
port suits and other types of litigation. Child support actions in-
volve an intimate, ongoing relationship between parent and child
which is absent in tort or contract actions between unrelated indi-
viduals. The distinction is not trivial. It may well be unreasona-
ble to exercise jurisdiction over a nonresident based only on an
obligation owed by him to an unrelated domiciliary. As the Court
stated in Hanson v. Denckla:51 "The unilateral activity of those
who claim some relationship with a nonresident defendant cannot
satisfy the requirement of contact with the forum State."52 On
the other hand, when the nonresident maintains a special interest
in the welfare of that domiciliary plaintiff, his or her relationship
to the forum takes on greater significance. Accordingly, the spe-
cial import of the parent-child bond may be relevant to a determi-
nation of the constitutionality of exercising jurisdiction over an
absent parent in an action for the child's support. Indeed, the
Supreme Court of the United States has recognized that the par-
ent-child relation may have constitutional dimensions. In Bellotti
v. Baird,53 the Court stated: 'The unique role in our society of
the family . . .requires that constitutional principles be applied
with sensitivity and flexibility to the special needs of parents and
children."54 The presence of the child in the forum state should
be one factor bearing on the reasonableness of exercising juris-
diction over the parent for support.
A profitable comparison can be made with the jurisdictional re-
quirement in child custody cases. Personal jurisdiction over the
50. It might be argued that the true contrast should be between the resources
and mobility of the two parents, not the child and one parent, since it is the custo-
dial parent, not the dependent child, who actually brings the suit. This ignores the
motivation argument. See note 48 supra.
51. 357 U.S. 235 (1958).
52. Id. at 253.
53. 99 S. Ct. 3035 (1979).
54. Id. at 3043. Significantly, the Supreme Court has also noted that the rela-
tionship between the plaintiff and defendant is relevant to a determination of the
propriety of exercising jurisdiction over the latter. In Rush v. Savchuk, 100 S. Ct.
571, 579 (1980), the Court stated: "Naturally, the parties' relationships with each
other may be significant in evaluating their ties to the forum." This principle
would seem to be most strongly implicated in child support suits because the inti-
mate parent-child relation is involved.
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defendant spouse is not required before a court may make a valid
custody order, even though custody of one's child has been la-
beled as "far more precious ... than property rights .... ,,5
Generally, jurisdiction to determine custody will exist if the fo-
rum is either the domicile or residence of the child.6 The doc-
trine derives from longstanding judicial concern for the welfare of
children. As Judge Cardozo once observed, "the jurisdiction of a
state to regulate the custody of infants found within its territory
... has its origin in the protection that is due to the incompetent
or helpless."5 7
If the welfare of the child is sufficient to outweigh, for jurisdic-
tional purposes, the powerful interest of the absent parent in ob-
taining custody, it is difficult to see why a similar consideration
should not operate to expand jurisdiction in child support litiga-
tion. The monetary interest at stake in a support suit is normally
no greater than the parental desire for custody. In addition,
merely expanding jurisdiction (while retaining the limit of funda-
mental fairness) does considerably less violence to the parent's
interest than dispensing with the requirement of personal juris-
diction altogether, as has been done with custody litigation.
But there are considerations beyond the respective interests of
the litigants which may be relevant to a determination of the pro-
priety of exercising jurisdiction. The forum state, for example,
may have an interest in the suit.5 8 Indeed, one eminent jurist has
55. May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528, 533 (1953). Personal jurisdiction over both
spouses is required, however, for a custody decree to be entitled to full faith and
credit. Id.
56. See R. WEnTrRAuB, supra note 10, at 194-95. See also Sampsell v. Superior
Court, 32 Cal. 2d 763, 197 P.2d 739 (1948).
57. Finlay v. Finlay, 240 N.Y. 429, 431, 148 N.E. 624, 625 (1925). California courts
have taken a similar stance. See, e.g., In re Walker, 228 Cal. App. 2d 217, 223, 39
Cal. Rptr. 243, 247 (1964): "The leitmotif of all of the cases dealing with child cus-
tody is that the primary, paramount and controlling consideration is the welfare of
the child."
58. The Supreme Court has recognized that the forum state's interests are rel-
evant to a determination of the reasonableness of exercising jurisdiction on the
basis of the contacts between the defendant and the forum. See World-Wide Volk-
swagen Corp. v. Woodson, 100 S. Ct. 559, 564 (1980); Kulko v. Superior Court, 436
U.S. 84, 92 (1978); McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 222-24 (1957);
Travelers Health Ass'n v. Virginia, 339 U.S. 643, 648-49 (1950). Moreover, several
state courts have emphasized the forum's interest in upholding jurisdiction in
child support actions. See, e.g., Neil v. Ridner, 153 Ind. App. 149, 286 N.E.2d 427
(1972); Poindexter v. Willis, 23 Ohio Misc. 199, 51 Ohio Op. 2d 157, 256 N.E.2d 254
(1970); Van Wagenberg v. Van Wagenberg, 241 Md. 154, 215 A.2d 812, cert. denied,
385 U.S. 833 (1966).
argued that the support of children is a matter in which the states
have a particularly strong interest.
The maintenance and support of children domiciled within a state, like
their education and custody, is a subject in which government itself is
deemed to have a peculiar interest and concern. Their tender years, their
inability to provide for themselves, the importance to the state that its fu-
ture citizens should be clothed, nourished and suitably educated, are con-
siderations which lead all civilized countries to assume some control over
the maintenance of minors.5 9
This state interest is both economic and sociological. The pres-
ence of unsupported children in the state imposes an economic
burden on the state's treasury through the welfare rolls.60 And
the presence of economically disadvantaged persons in a state
has an eventual adverse effect culturally. Thus, the state has a le-
gitimate interest in providing a forum for its residents in support
litigation.
Regionally, however, another factor may be operative. Signifi-
cant recent decisions 6 ' and some headline-catching divorce suits62
have drawn attention to California divorce courts and generated a
concomitant concern on the part of the judiciary that California
not become a favored forum for the litigation of personal claims
arising from foreign marital relationships. 63 This interest of the
59. Yarborough v. Yarborough, 290 U.S. 202, 220 (1933) (Stone, J., dissenting).
Justice Stone noted that the state's interest is particularly strong in the children
of divorced couples because they are usually young (less than 10 years of age)
when divorce occurs. Id. n.12.
60. See In re Marriage of Lontos, 89 Cal. App. 3d 61, 72, 152 Cal. Rptr. 271, 278
(1979); Nelson, Family Support from Fugitive Fathers: A Proposed Amendment to
Michigan's Long-Arm Statute, 3 PROSPECTUs 399 (1970).
61. See, e.g., Marvin v. Marvin, 18 Cal. 3d 660, 557 P.2d 106, 134 Cal. Rptr. 815
(1977).
62. See, e.g., Jagger v. Superior Court, 96 Cal. App. 3d 579, 158 Cal. Rptr. 163
(1979) (internationally famous rock musician sued for divorce in Los Angeles).
For another rather spectacular divorce suit, see Smilgis, Marvin Mitchelson Has
Progressed From 'Palimony' to 'Petromony, Soraya Kashoggi is Suing for $2 Bil-
lion, PEOPLE, August 27, 1979, at 34 (nonresident billionaire oil sheik sued for ali-
mony in California; jurisdiction premised on enormous financial interests in the
state).
63. In the colorful language of one appellate court:
Although as a general proposition the State of California may wish to per-
suade out-of-state business to move to California, the resolution of extra-
marital shipwrecks which have foundered on the rocks of a foreign shore,
does not constitute a desirable form of such business. If a newly arrived
claimant in California could initiate an action against a nonresident... ,
then California's courts would be thrown wide open to the grossest form
of forum shopping, for which the only equipment needed would be a tenu-
ous claim to some California connection, a serviceable carpetbag, and a
one-way ticket from New York, London, Paris or Cannes.
Henderson v. Henderson, 77 Cal. App. 3d 583, 593-94, 142 Cal. Rptr. 478, 484 (1978).
The Henderson case involved an effort by a newly arrived California resident to
assert a support obligation against a Florida domiciliary arising from an intimate
nonmarital relationship in that state. The court rejected the plaintiffs efforts to
premise jurisdiction on business contacts the defendant had with California.
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state in protecting the integrity of its judicial system from forum
shopping suggests caution in expanding jurisdiction in domestic
relations cases.
In addition, it may be suggested that a state's interest in the
maintenance and support of its residents is adequately served by
the provisions of the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support
Act.64 The Act, or a "substantially similar" law, has been passed
by all fifty states, the organized territories and the District of Co-
lumbia.65 It provides some relief for persons unable to litigate a
support claim in a distant forum by allowing the plaintiff to file a
petition for support in his or her home state and have the merits
adjudicated in the state of the obligor's residence.66 The issue
was recently considered by the United States Supreme Court in
Kulko v. Superior Court,67 a support suit brought by a California
domiciliary against her ex-husband in New York. The Court
noted that California was a signatory to the Act and reasoned that
the Act thus facilitated protection of both California's interest in
the welfare of its residents and the plaintiff's interest in prosecut-
ing the suit without requiring personal jurisdiction over the non-
resident defendant.6 8
Actually, the utility of the Uniform Act is open to question.
Problems which have been cited as reducing its effectiveness in-
clude lackluster enforcement,6 9 lack of true reciprocity between
member states,7 0 lack of sympathy to the plaintiff's claims in the
foreign court,7 ' and the low priority given to cases under the Act
by county prosecutors due to the more pressing demands of crim-
inal matters and other local business. 72 Moreover, the Act does
not address the problems of locating and serving the supporting
64. 9A UNIFORM LAWS ANN. 647 (West 1979).
65. UNIFORM RECIPROCAL ENFORCEMENT OF SUPPORT ACT (1950 version), Com-
missioner's Prefatory Note, 9A UNIFORM LAWS ANN. 748 (West 1979).
66. UNIFORM RECIPROCAL ENFORCEMENT OF SUPPORT ACT §§ 11, 14, 18 (1968 ver-
sion).
67. 436 U.S. 84 (1978).
68. Id. at 98-101. The Kulko case is discussed more fully in the text accompa-
nying notes 107-21 infra. See also Leverett v. Superior Court, 222 Cal. App. 2d 126,
34 Cal. Rptr. 784 (1963).
69. Nelson, Family Support from Fugitive Fathers: A Proposed Amendment to
Michigan's Long-Arm Statute, 3 PROSPECTUS 399, 405-06 (1970).
70. Id. at 406-07.
71. Comment, Long-Arm Jurisdiction in Alimony and Custody Cases, 73
COLUM. L. REV. 289, 306 (1973).
72, Nelson, Family Support from Fugitive Fathers: A Proposed Amendment to
Michigan's Long-Arm Statute, 3 PROSPECTUS 399, 406 (1970).
spouse. The plaintiff must still know where the defendant can be
found and served with process. 73 Finally, unless both involved
states are signatories to the Uniform Civil Liability for Support
Act, a companion statute,7 4 the applicable law is that of the de-
fendant's residence.7 5 The delinquent spouse may have chosen a
residence with favorable alimony or child support laws, thus se-
verely limiting the Act's effectiveness. 7 6 This aspect alone makes
the Act an unattractive alternative to personal jurisdiction. Cu-
mulatively, the above factors may preclude meaningful redress
through the Act altogether. Accordingly, California's participation
in the multi-state statutory scheme should not prevent its courts
from expanding jurisdiction over domestic relations suits to the
limits of due process.
The foregoing considerations of policy suggest that a broadened
area of state court jurisdiction is desirable in domestic relations
cases-at least when the support or maintenance of children is at
issue. In alimony cases the arguments for expanding jurisdiction
are not quite as compelling. The intimate bond between the par-
ties which adds import to the defendant's contacts with the state
in child support suits is absent in suits for spousal support be-
cause the relationship between the spouses has ruptured. More-
over, unlike a child, the plaintiff spouse is not helpless. And the
ultimate monetary burden imposed on the defendant by an ali-
mony decree might be greater than that imposed by a decree for
child support. Alimony payments can continue indefinitely, but
child support ceases when the child reaches majority.TV
Still, several commentators have focused on the need for ex-
panded jurisdiction in spousal support actions, noting that the de-
pendent spouse may lack the resources necessary to pursue the
delinquent to a distant state.78 This problem has become more
73. Id. at 405.
74. This Act facilitates the use of the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Sup-
port Act by imposing identical obligations of support on the signatory states. UNI-
FORM CIVIL LIABILITY FOR SUPPORT ACT § 13 (1954 version). Its utility is limited,
however, because only four states (California, Maine, New Hampshire, and Utah)
have adopted it. 9 UNIFOPm LAwS ANN. 171 (West 1979).
75. UNIFORM RECIPROCAL ENFORCEMENT OF SUPPORT ACT § 4 (1968 version).
76. For an illuminating presentation of the many variations in familial obliga-
tions among the states, see Freed & Foster, Divorce in the Fifty States: An Over-
view as of 1978, 13 FAM. L. Q. 105 (1979).
77. See Comment, Extending "Minimum Contacts" to Alimony: Mizner v. Miz-
ner, 20 HAST. L. J. 361, 377 (1968).
78. See Comment, Divorce Jurisdiction After the 1977 Amendment to the Illi-
nois Long-Arm Statute: Extending a Legal Doctrine or Creating a Legal Halluci.
nation? 9 Loy. Cmr. L. J. 893, 896 (1978). See also Nelson, Family Support from
Fugitive Fathers: A Proposed Amendment to Michigan's Long-Arm Statute, 3 PRO-
SPECTUS 399, 404 (1970). Mr. Nelson notes that "mothers receiving aid to depen-
dent children are concentrated heavily in those occupational groups in which
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acute for indigent plaintiffs now that Shaffer v. Heitner7 9 has elim-
inated attachment of the defendant's property as a source of local
redress.80 And the alternative of filing suit in the defendant's
domicile may be more than costly and inconvenient. It may be
tactically unsound. In one recent case, a woman was held to have
submitted herself to the "continuing jurisdiction" of the courts of
her former husband's domicile by bringing suit there for support.
The ex-husband simply waited for a few months after the decree
and then sued to reduce the support payments on the ground of
changed circumstances, thus forcing her to return and relitigate
the issue in an inconvenient court.81 It would seem, therefore,
that although public policy seems more strongly to favor ex-
panded assertions of jurisdiction in suits for child support than in
suits for alimony, there are valid reasons for taking a liberal ap-
proach to jurisdiction in both types of litigation.
In summary, there are a number of policy considerations which
are relevant to a determination of the constitutionality of exercis-
ing jurisdiction over nonresident defendants in support suits. The
migratory American lifestyle suggests that facilitation of long-arm
jurisdiction should be a priority in domestic relations litigation.
Advances in transportation and communication have lessened the
burden of defense for a nonresident defendant. The special vul-
nerability of children, the intimate parent-child relationship, and
the state's interest in providing a means of redress for its resi-
dents all suggest that jurisdiction in familial support suits should
be expanded. Conversely, the state's interest in protecting the in-
tegrity of its judicial system from forum shopping and the poten-
tial for relief through the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of
Support Act suggest that such an expansion of jurisdiction may
be unnecessary and perhaps undesirable.
Generally, however, the Uniform Act will be of only limited
value. Thus, where no forum shopping is apparent, consideration
of the policies enumerated above should normally lead to ex-
requirements for training and education are at a minimum, remuneration is low,
turnover is high, and there is little economic security." Id. n.24.
79. 433 U.S. 186 (1977).
80. See note 25 supra. See also Weintraub, Texas Long-Arm Jurisdiction in
Family Law Cases, 32 Sw. L. J. 965, 970 (1978): "Without the availability of quasi
in rem jurisdiction to seize the property of a nonresident spouse, the importance
of obtaining personal jurisdiction over that spouse for enforceable money awards
incident to family law litigation is increased."
81. Leverett v. Superior Court, 222 Cal. App. 2d 126, 34 Cal. Rptr. 784 (1963).
panded jurisdiction in child support suits, and occasionally in
suits for spousal support. A policy-centered approach might even
have an additional salutary effect. Focusing on the relevant poli-
cies should make clearer the true basis for decision in each case,
thus lending desirable consistency and predictability to an area of
the law long characterized by ad hoc decision-making.
THE CALn o RmA APPROACH
Three features dominate the approach of California courts to ju-
risdictional questions in spousal and child support suits: reliance
on bases for jurisdiction developed for other types of cases, rigid
application of the Hanson "purposeful availment" standard,82 and
superficial treatment of the relevant policies. These characteris-
tics are reflected in opinions from both the intermediate appellate
courts and the California Supreme Court.
The Bases for Jurisdiction
The California Judicial Council has published an explanatory
Comment to the state's long-arm statute that provides a conve-
nient starting point for jurisdictional analysis. 83 The Comment
notes that section 410.10 of the Code of Civil Procedure was
designed to allow California courts to exercise jurisdiction com-
mensurate with the limits of due process, and that the section in-
cludes "all the recognized bases of judicial jurisdiction."84 These
"recognized bases" include presence, domicile, residence, citizen-
ship, consent, appearance, doing business in the state, doing an
act in the state, causing an effect in the state by an act or omis-
sion elsewhere, and ownership, use or possession of a thing in the
state.85 Some of these bases were recognized at common law.
Others developed as concomitants to the now-famous prolifera-
tion of state long-arm statutes which followed the Supreme
Court's expansive opinion in International Shoe.86
Significantly, the Judicial Council acknowledged that its
enumeration of constitutionally sufficient bases was not exhaus-
tive87 and that in personam jurisdiction in support actions could
be based on any relationship to the state which "would make it
reasonable for the state to hear and determine such action." 88
82. See text accompanying notes 18-22 supra.
83. CAL. Crv. PRoc. CODE § 410.10, Comment (West 1973).
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. See R. WE=NrRAuB, supra note 10, at 93.
87. The Council noted that "other relationships to a state" could serve as ba-
ses for jurisdiction. CAL. CIrV. PRoc. CODE § 410.10, Comment (West 1973).
88. Id.
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Nonetheless, California's courts have made no effort to develop a
basis for jurisdiction tailored to support suits. They have relied
instead on the already existing bases listed in the Judicial Coun-
cil Comment.
Titus v. Superior Court,89 the first support case to reach an ap-
pellate court under section 410.10 of the Code of Civil Procedure,
is illustrative. From 1961 to 1970 the Tituses lived in Massachu-
setts, where all three of their children were born.9O In 1970, they
were divorced, the decree providing that Mr. Titus was to support
the children.91 Custody was shared; Mr. Titus was to have the
children during the week, Mrs. Titus on weekends. 92 In 1971, Mrs.
Titus moved to California, where she remarried.93 Subsequently,
Mr. Titus prepared a visitation agreement which he sent to Cali-
fornia for signature by his ex-wife. The agreement provided that
the children were to visit their mother in California over the sum-
mer.94 She was to support them while they were there. The
airfare was to be shared by the parents.95
In August, 1971, the former Mrs. Titus brought suit in California
to establish the Massachusetts divorce as a California judgment,
to modify the decree to award custody to her, and to require Mr.
Titus to pay child support.96 She premised jurisdiction on the two
voluntary acts of Mr. Titus: sending the children to California and
sending the agreement to California for signature. 97
The court structured its analysis around traditional jurisdic-
tional bases. Sending the children into the state was deemed to
"fall within the causing 'effects in the state by an act done else-
where' base of jurisdiction."98 Sending the agreement into Cali-
fornia for signature was said to come under the "doing of an act in
the state" basis.99 The court then turned to the standard due pro-
cess considerations of fairness and reasonableness in evaluating
the petitioner's contacts under these bases, ultimately deciding
89. 23 Cal. App. 3d 792, 100 Cal. Rptr. 477 (1972).







97. Id. at 801, 100 Cal. Rptr. at 484.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 803, 100 Cal. Rptr. at 486.
that jurisdiction did not exist.OO
Both bases surfaced again in Judd v. Superior Court,lo' another
support action involving a nonresident defendant. The Judds
were married in New York in 1950 and resided on the east coast
until their divorce in 1964. Mrs. Judd and the children then
moved to California. 102 Over the next ten years, Mr. Judd wrote
and telephoned his children, sent support payments to his ex-
wife, and on three occasions visited the children in California. 0 3
In 1975, the former Mrs. Judd sued in California for spousal and
child support.1o4 The trial court found that it had personal juris-
diction over Mr. Judd because he had done acts elsewhere that
caused an effect in California (telephone calls, correspondence
and making support payments) and because he had done acts in
California (visiting his children there).105 The appellate court re-
jected both bases as insufficient under the facts before it, noting
that the further constitutional criteria of fairness and reasonable-
ness remained unsatisfied.l0 6
More recently, in Kulko v. Superior Court,10 7 the California
Supreme Court used the "causing an effect in the state" basis to
secure personal jurisdiction over a New York father whose chil-
dren resided in California. The Kulkos, New York domiciliaries,
were married in California in 1959 during Mr. Kulko's brief stop-
over en route to Korea for military service.108 Mrs. Kulko re-
turned immediately to New York, where she was joined by her
husband after his tour of duty.l0 9 Two children were born to the
marriage in New York, which remained the situs of the family re-
lationship until the parents separated in 1972. That year, Mrs.
100. "We apprehend that it would be unfair and unreasonable to hold that a
nonresident parent has submitted himself to the jurisdiction of another state
merely by the act of sending his children to that state temporarily for the purpose
of visiting with the other parent." Id. at 803, 100 Cal. Rptr. at 485.
101. 60 Cal. App. 3d 38, 131 Cal. Rptr. 246 (1976).
102. Id. at 41-42, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 247.
103. Id. at 44, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 249.
104. Id. at 41, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 247.
105. Id. at 44-45, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 249-50.
106. "We find that it would neither be fair to petitioner nor reasonable to hold
that this state acquired jurisdiction over him merely because he sent support pay-
ments here and communicated with his children and their mother by telephone or
mail." Id. at 45, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 249.
The Judd court also dealt briefly with an effort by the respondent to predicate
jurisdiction on the "doing business in the state" basis. Without passing on the
constitutional sufficiency of this basis in support actions, the court dismissed re-
spondent's contentions as not grounded in the evidence. Id. at 43-44, 131 Cal. Rptr.
at 248-49.
107. 19 Cal. 3d 514, 564 P.2d 353, 138 Cal. Rptr. 586 (1977), rev'd, 436 U.S. 84
(1978).
108. 436 U.S. at 86.
109. Id. at 87.
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Kulko obtained a Haitian divorce and moved to California, where
she remarried. The divorce decree provided that Mr. Kulko was
to have custody of the children during the school year. Mrs.
Kulko was to have custody during vacation periods.110
A year later, the daughter requested that she be allowed to live
with her mother in California."' Acquiescing, Mr. Kulko
purchased a one-way plane ticket for her.112 Subsequently, the
son telephoned his mother to request that he be allowed to join
his sister."l3 Unknown to Mr. Kulko, his ex-wife sent their son a
one-way plane ticket, which the boy used to fly to California.114
The former Mrs. Kulko then sued in California to increase Mr.
Kulko's child support obligation." 5
The California Supreme Court found that Mr. Kulko had
"caused an effect in the state" by sending his daughter to live
there with her mother.116 Moreover, exercising personal jurisdic-
tion over Mr. Kulko was "reasonable" because he had thus pur-
posefully "availed himself of the full benefit and protection of the
laws of [California].1"117 The court reasoned that California's
"laws, institutions and resources-its police and fire protection,
its school system, its hospital services, its recreational facilities,
its libraries and museums" all redounded vicariously to the bene-
fit of Mr. Kulko through his children.118 The California court also
found that Mr. Kulko had derived an economic benefit from the
presence of his children in the state because he no longer had to
support them during the school year."19
The United States Supreme Court reversed, finding that Mr.
Kulko did not derive any economic benefit from his children's
presence in California. "Any diminution in appellant's household
costs resulted, not from the child's presence in California, but
rather from her absence from appellant's home."120 Moreover, the




113. Id. at 88.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. 19 Cal. 3d at 521-22, 564 P.2d at 356, 138 Cal. Rptr. at 589.
117. Id. at 524, 564 P.2d at 358, 138 Cal. Rptr. at 591.
118. Id. at 522, 564 P.2d at 356, 138 Cal. Rptr. at 589.
119. Id. at 524-25, 564 P.2d at 358, 138 Cal. Rptr. at 591.
120. 436 U.S. at 95.
the child, not the father, who had not "in any event.. purpose-
fully sought [them] for himself."121
California's longstanding reliance on the "doing an act in the
state" and "causing an effect in the state" bases in support ac-
tions appears misdirected. Neither basis reflects the policies im-
plicated by support suits. Indeed, both were formulated in
response to the demands of cases involving tortious conduct or
commercial activities affecting local residents.122 Their utility
under those circumstances is clear. Long distance tort or contract
actions often stem from acts done in the state or effects caused
there by acts done elsewhere.l23 Accordingly, the existence of
such contacts indicates that exercising jurisdiction over a nonresi-
dent in a tort or contract action may be reasonable. On the other
hand, these contacts have little bearing on the reasonableness of
exercising jurisdiction over nonresidents in support suits. Sup-
port obligations spring from the intimate nature of the familial
bond and societal concern for the welfare of dependent persons.
Specific acts performed by the defendant or effects caused in the
state by his conduct elsewhere are seldom relevant. Conse-
quently, neither the "doing an act in the state" basis nor the
"causing an effect in the state" basis will normally have much
value as a starting point for jurisdictional analysis in support ac-
tions.
Significantly, the disutility of the "causing an effect in the state"
basis in support suits was emphasized by the United States
Supreme Court in Kulko. Adverting to the exposition of the rule
in the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws, the Court noted
that the test "was intended to reach wrongful activity outside of
the State causing injury within the State ... or commercial activ-
ity affecting state residents."12 4 The Court found it "apparent"
that California's reliance in a support action on Kulko's having
caused an effect in the state was "misplaced."12 5
Nonetheless, the "causing an effect in the state" test continues
to be applied by California courts in support suits against nonres-
121. Id. at 94 n.7.
122. See R. WErrTRAUB, supra note 10, at 109-13; Reese & Galston, Doing an Act
or Causing Consequences as Bases of Judicial Jurisdiction, 44 IowA L. REV. 249
(1959).
123. See, e.g., Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352 (1927); Sibley v. Superior Court, 16
Cal. 3d 442, 546 P.2d 322, 128 Cal. Rptr. 34 (1976); Buckeye Boiler Co. v. Superior
Court, 71 Cal. 2d 893, 458 P.2d 57, 80 Cal. Rptr. 113 (1969); Owens v. Superior Court,
52 Cal. 2d 822, 345 P.2d 921 (1959); National Life of Florida Corp. v. Superior Court,
21 Cal. App. 3d 281, 98 Cal. Rptr. 435 (1971). See also Gorflnkel & Levine, Long-Arm
Jurisdiction in California Under New Section 410.10 of the Code of Civil Procedure,
21 HAST. L. J. 1163 (1970).
124. 436 U.S. at 96.
125. Id.
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idents. The most recent such case, In re Marriage of Lontos,126
involved a former California domiciliary who had maintained sig-
nificant economic and personal ties to the state. The Lontoses es-
tablished their marital domicile in San Diego, California, from
1963 to 1969.127 That year, Mr. Lontos, a United States Marine,
was transferred to Alburquerque, New Mexico. Mrs. Lontos and
the children accompanied him.128 The family occupied rented ac-
comodation on an Alburquerque military base and arranged for
their California home to be rented and managed by a realtor in
Chula Vista, California. They maintained a joint bank account in
Chula Vista, and stored boxes of personal effects at Mrs. Lontos'
mother's home in San Diego.129
On January 1, 1970, Mr. Lontos deserted his family. No longer
eligible for military housing because her husband was gone, Mrs.
Lontos and the children returned to the marital home in Califor-
nia. Ultimately, she filed suit in California for spousal and child
support.130
In an articulate and well-reasoned opinion, the appellate court
held that California could properly exercise jurisdiction over Mr.
Lontos. The thrust of the opinion was properly directed at the In-
ternational Shoe fairness standard,13 1 but, in a later passage, the
court felt compelled to assert satisfaction of the "causing an effect
in the state" test as additional support for its holding. The court
noted that the use of the "causing an effect in the state" basis in
support actions had been "placed in judicial limbo"132 by the
Supreme Court in Kulko, but argued that Mr. Lontos' abandon-
ment of his dependents in New Mexico was functionally
equivalent to "the hypothetical shooting of a bullet across a state
line into California,"'13 3 because Mrs. Lontos' return to the marital
126. 89 Cal. App. 3d 61, 152 Cal. Rptr. 271 (1979).
127. Id. at 64, 152 Cal. Rptr. at 272.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 68, 152 Cal. Rptr. at 275.
130. Id. at 64, 152 Cal. Rptr. at 273.
131. See text accompanying notes 11-13 supra.
132. 89 Cal. App. 3d at 71, 152 Cal. Rptr. at 277.
133. Id. The "hypothetical" referred to is from the American Law Institute's
published caveat to § 37 of the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws.
The act may have been done with the intention of causing effects in the
state. If so, the state may exercise the same judicial jurisdiction over the
actor as it could have exercised if these effects had resulted from an act
done within its territory ... So one who intentionally shoots a bullet into
a state is as subject to the judicial jurisdiction of the state as to causes of
home was foreseeable.
This stretching of jurisdictional facts to fit a basis for jurisdic-
tion not designed to reflect the policies implicated by support ac-
tions appears unwise. The Lontos court might more profitably
have searched for a new basis on which to lay the foundation of
its decision, eschewing juridical gymnastics in favor of forthright
analysis. Mr. Lontos' abandonment of his family could certainly
be deemed a "contact" with California in view of the direct and
inevitable consequences-his wife's return to the state and subse-
quent dependence on the California welfare system. 34 The sig-
nificance of Mr. Lontos' act, however, lay in the fact that it had
consequences deriving from an intimate relationship nurtured
under the laws of California, not in its superficial resemblance to
a tort. It should have been so analyzed. Contorting its visage to
mirror the face of the tort-spawned "causing an effect in the
state" test added nothing to the analysis and obscured the true
basis for decision. 35
In summary, California courts continue to rely in support ac-
tions on jurisdictional bases formulated for other types of cases.
Analyses so structured tend to reflect policy considerations that
are more nearly relevant to tort or contract actions than to suits
for familial support. Accordingly, California should develop a new
basis for jurisdiction in support litigation which expresses the
special considerations of policy attached to intra-family law suits.
The Hanson Purposeful Availment Standard.
Before upholding jurisdiction over a nonresident, a court must
always ensure that his or her contacts with the forum are of such
a nature and quality that it is fair and reasonable to require a de-
action arising from the shot as if he had actually fired the bullet in the
state.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CoNucT OF LAWS § 37, Caveat, Comment a, at 157.
134. 89 Cal. App. 3d at 71, 152 Cal. Rptr. at 277.
135. Compare the approach taken in Lontos, Judd, and Titus with that taken in
Bartlett v. Superior Court, 86 Cal. App. 3d 72, 150 Cal. Rptr. 25 (1978), where the
court read the Supreme Court's disapproval of California's use of the "causing an
effect in the state" basis in support actions to mandate total disregard of a contact
so classified.
"Petitioner caused a California resident to become pregnant." This is an
apparent effort to invoke the doctrine that jurisdiction attaches to one who
causes an effect within the state. The Kulko opinion points out that this
principle, applied in cases involving torts and commercial activities, is not
applicable to personal domestic relations.
86 Cal. App. 3d at 76, 150 Cal. Rptr. at 27. This latter approach appears to be
equally undesirable, as it promotes inattention to contacts of potential value in
evaluating the reasonableness of exercising jurisdiction. Better would be a func-
tional analysis of each contact the nonresident has with the state without regard
to artificial or irrelevant classifications.
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fense there. 36 The salient feature of this kind of due process
analysis is flexibility. As the Supreme Court noted in Kulko:
Like any standard that requires a determination of "reasonableness," the
"minimum contacts" test of International Shoe is not susceptible of
mechanical application; rather, the facts of each case must be weighed to
determine whether the requisite "affiliating circumstances" are present
We recognize that this determination is one in which few answers
will be written "in black and white. The greys are dominant and even
among them the shades are innumerable .... ,,137
Early California support suits involving section 410.10 of the
Code of Civil Procedure reflected this philosophy. Thus, the Titus
court rejected jurisdiction "upon a consideration of fairness to pe-
titioner in accord with contemporary views of fair play and sub-
stantial justice and in the best interests of the interstate
systems .... ,138 This approach was echoed four years later by
the appellate court in Judd.139
More recently, however, California courts have gone beyond
this simple fairness test and have applied, somewhat rigidly, the
"purposeful availment" test of Hanson v. Denckla4O to jurisdic-
tional issues in support suits. In Hoerler v. Superior Court,141 the
court declared that "[t] he question before us is... whether 'peti-
tioner purposefully availed himself of the privilege of conducting
business in California or of the benefits and protections of Cali-
fornia laws ... [or] anticipated that he would derive any eco-
nomic benefit [here] as a result of his [act outside California]
.... "142 And the Lontos court set forth a four-tiered analysis,
the second step involving an inquiry into "whether [the defend-
ant had] 'purposefully availed' himself of the privilege of con-
ducting activities in California."14 3
This religious application of the Hanson standard to support ac-
tions stems from the state supreme court's opinion in Kulko. In
that case, the court mandated the Hanson test for support suits
136. See International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
137. Kulko v. Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84, 92 (1978).
138. Titus v. Superior Court, 23 Cal. App. 3d 792, 804, 100 Cal. Rptr. 477, 487
(1972).
139. Judd v. Superior Court, 60 Cal. App. 3d 38, 45, 131 Cal. Rptr. 246, 249 (1976).
140. 357 U.S. 235 (1958). See text accompanying notes 18-22 ssupra.
141. 85 Cal. App. 3d 533, 149 Cal. Rptr. 569 (1978).
142. Id. at 535, 149 CaL Rptr. at 570 (quoting Sibley v. Superior Court, 16 Cal. 3d
442, 447, 546 P.2d 322, 325, 128 Cal. Rptr. 34, 37 (1976)). The Hoerler case is dis-
cussed in detail later in this Comment. See text accompanying notes 184-96 infra.
143. In re Marriage of Lontos, 89 Cal. App. 3d 61, 68, 152 Cal. Rptr. 271, 275
(1979).
but found it satisfied by the defendant's acquiescence in the pres-
ence of his children in California.144
Significantly, the Hanson test arose in the context of a commer-
cially-based cause of action against a corporate defendant. 145 Al-
though dictum in the opinion suggests the standard is applicable
to all types of cases, 146 the question naturally arises whether the
"purposeful availment" test should be rigidly applied to defend-
ants in family law suits. Special considerations of policy may
make the exercise of jurisdiction desirable in these cases even
when the defendant has not deliberately sought the benefit of the
forum's laws. 147
The debate over the applicability of Hanson is not new. Some
commentators have taken the view that the "purposeful avail-
ment" test should be applied to all assertions of state court juris-
diction, 4 8 while others have attacked the decision itself149 or
decried a literal, wooden application of the standard. 5 0 This criti-
cal ambivalence has spread to the courts, with some jurisdictions
rejecting the Hanson test in favor of the more flexible "fairness"
144. [W] e start with the premise that a nonresident parent who allows his
minor child or children to reside in California has by that act purposely
availed himself of the benefits and protections of the laws of California to
such an extent that absent unusual circumstances or countervailing pub-
lic policies such act would support personal jurisdiction over the nonresi-
dent parent for actions concerning the support of these children.
Kulko v. Superior Court, 19 Cal. 3d 514, 522, 564 P.2d 353, 356, 138 Cal. Rptr. 586, 589
(1977), rev'd, 436 U.S. 84 (1978). See also text accompanying notes 116-21 supra.
145. The Hanson case involved a suit by the executrix of an estate against a
foreign trust company. See text accompanying notes 18-22 supra.
146. "[Ilt is essential in each case that there be some act by which the defend-
ant purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the fo-
rum state, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws." Hanson v.
Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958) (emphasis added).
147. See text accompanying notes 39-81 supra.
148. It may confidently be predicted that the facts in Hanson v. Denckla
themselves mark the outer limits of permissible exercise of judicial juris-
diction under the due process clause, and that the exercise of jurisdiction
will hereafter be sustained, in keeping with the McGee trend, on sets of
facts only narrowly distinguishable from those in Hanson v. Denckla ....
Leflar, Conflict of Laws, 34 N.Y.U. L. REV. 20, 33-34 (1959).
149. See Hazard, A General Theory of State Court Jurisdiction, 1956 Sup. CT.
REv. 241, 244 ("a line of analysis that in all charity and after mature reflection is
impossible to follow ... "); Reese & Galston, Doing an Act or Causing Conse-
quences as Bases of Judicial Jurisdiction, 44 IowA L. REv. 249, 257 (1959) (arguing
that the Court gave insufficient consideration to forum conveniens concepts).
150. See, e.g., Woods, Pennoyer's Demise: Personal Jurisdiction After Shaffer
and Kulko and a Modest Prediction Regarding World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v.
Woodson, 20 ARmz. L. REV. 863 (1978). Professor Woods notes that determinations
of the essential constitutional criterion of fairness, "like those of justice and
beauty, should incorporate relevant considerations as they arise and not be bound
by the constraints of history." Id. at 897-98. See also Currie, The Growth of the
Long Arm: Eight Years of Extended Jurisdiction in Illinois, 1963 U. ILT_ L. F. 533
(Hanson should be confined to its facts); accord, Foster, Expanding Jurisdiction
over Nonresidents, 32 Wis. BAR BuLL. 20 (Supp. Oct. 1959).
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standard of International Shoe .151
The focus of much of the debate has been in the field of prod-
ucts liability. In Phillips v. Anchor Hocking Glass Corp.,152 a
products liability suit against the nonresident manufacturer of an
allegedly defective dish, the Arizona Supreme Court expressly re-
jected the Hanson purposeful act requirement. Under the as-
sumed facts, the defendant had done no business in the state and
the plaintiff had purchased the defective product outside the
state. 5 3 Accordingly, there was little question that the Hanson
standard, if applicable, had not been met. In upholding jurisdic-
tion anyway, the court stated: "A rule limiting jurisdiction to de-
fendants who 'purposefully' conduct activities within the state
cannot be properly applied in product liability cases in view of the
fortuitous route by which products enter any particular state."5 4
The Anchor Hocking decision has received critical approval, with
one commentator arguing for "an expanded jurisdictional test em-
phasizing the interest of the state and the relative convenience of
the parties" 55 in products liability actions.
Of course, any trend toward expanding jurisdiction in products
liability cases might be attributable to the recent expansion of
strict tort liability against "deep pocket" manufacturers. To the
extent that sympathy factors are relevant, however, an analogy to
child support suits might be appropriate. The same wide dispar-
151. For an illustrative collection of cases in products liability, contracts, and
torts, see Annot., 24 A.L.R.3d 532 (1969); Annot., 23 A.LR.3d 550 (1969); Annot., 19
A.L.R.3d 13 (1968). The Hanson case itself reflected the division of opinion, with
the four-man minority espousing the "fundamental fairness" approach. See Han-
son v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 258-59 (1958) (Black, J., dissenting).
152. 100 Ariz. 251, 413 P.2d 732 (1966).
153. Id. at 253, 413 P.2d at 733.
154. Id. at 256, 413 P.2d at 735.
155. Comment, Tortious Act as a Basis for Jurisdiction in Products Liability
Cases, 33 FORDHAie L. REV. 671, 685 (1965). The student commentator argued that
the Hanson standard should not be applied in products liability cases and noted
that the trend of state cases was
to consider the reasonableness of the defendant's acts in a more general
sense, including such factors as the existence of a state statute designed
to provide a means of redress for its citizens, the hardship of an out-of-
state trial to the plaintiff, the place and nature of the injury, and the na-
ture of defendant's defective product.
Id. at 686. A recent Supreme Court opinion, however, has cast doubt on the valid-
ity of the Anchor Hocking approach. In World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Wood-
son, 100 S. Ct. 559 (1980), the Court reaffirmed the viability of Hanson in a
products liability suit against a nonresident automobile dealer. The full ramifica-
tions of World-Wide Volkswagen are not yet known, of course, but it seems clear
that a blanket rejection of Hanson in products liability suits would be improper.
ity between plaintiff and defendant resources is present in both
types of cases, suggesting a potential for heightened judicial solic-
itude toward both injured claimants in products liability suits and
child claimants in support suits. The analogy can be strength-
ened by focusing on the forum state's interests. An injured plain-
tiff in a products liability action might well become a ward of the
forum state if uncompensated. The forum thus has an interest in
promoting his or her recovery.156 Similarly, the unsupported chil-
dren of delinquent parents become a drain on the welfare system
of the forum, giving rise to a comparable forum interest in pro-
moting their recovery. 5 7 These considerations suggest that juris-
dictional issues in both types of cases merit enhanced flexibility
in analysis and that the limiting Hanson standard may be inappo-
site to support suits as well as to some products liability actions.
Indeed, in spite of the sweeping language of the Hanson opin-
ion,158 it is possible that the Court never intended its "purposeful
availment" standard to be applied literally in other types of cases.
Historically, Hanson followed within a year the Court's decision
in McGee v. International Life Insurance Co.,159 a case in which
the Court noted that "a trend is clearly discernible toward ex-
panding the permissible scope of state jurisdiction over foreign
corporations and other nonresidents."' 60 The Hanson opinion
might thus be explainable in terms of a desire by the Supreme
Court to encourage interstate business by slowing the rapid ex-
pansion of state court jurisdiction before the inevitable federalism
consequences became significant.' 6' This rationale is absent in a
noncommercial context, and suggests that the Court did not in-
tend its "purposeful availment" language to be applied, for exam-
ple, to domestic relations cases.162
156. See Comment, supra note 155 at 685.
157. See In re Marriage of Lontos, 89 Cal. App. 3d 61, 72, 152 Cal. Rptr. 271, 278
(1979).
158. See note 146 supra.
159. 355 U.S. 220 (1957).
160. Id. at 222.
161. Concern for interstate federalism has been a feature of the Supreme
Court's approach to long-arm jurisdiction since International Shoe. In that
landmark case, the Court noted that the reasonableness of exercising jurisdiction
over a nonresident was to be assessed "in the context of our federal system of gov-
ernment." International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 317 (1945). See also
World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 100 S. Ct. 559, 565 (1980):
[W] e have never accepted the proposition that state lines are irrelevant
for jurisdictional purposes, nor could we and remain faithful to the princi-
ples of interstate federalism embodied in the Constitution .... The sover-
eignty of each State [implies] a limitation on the sovereignty of all of its
sister States-a limitation express or implicit in both the original scheme
of the Constitution and the Fourteenth Amendment.
162. Professors Arthur von Mehran and Donald Trautman have suggested that
the Court rejected jurisdiction in Hanson simply because it disapproved of the fo-
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A problem is raised, however, by Kulko v. Superior Court,163 in
which the United States Supreme Court for the first time dealt
with a state's assertion of jurisdiction in the context of a child
support suit against a nonresident parent.164 Troubling is the
Court's rather thorough discussion of the Hanson criteria.165 If
Kulko is viewed as mandating a strict application of the Hanson
test to support suits, then any criticism of the California courts
for so doing is clearly unwarranted.
But Kulko need not be read so broadly. In the first place, it ap-
pears that the Supreme Court's discussion of the Hanson stan-
dard was only designed to refute the California court's basis for
asserting jurisdiction. The lower court, without raising other indi-
cia of reasonableness, had premised its assertion of jurisdiction
on satisfaction of the Hanson test, suggesting that satisfaction of
the "purposeful availment" standard alone would supply a suffi-
cient basis for jurisdiction.166 On review, the Supreme Court
found that the California court had erred in determining that the
defendant father had purposefully availed himself of the benefits
and protections of California's laws.1 67 Since the facts did not
otherwise justify the conclusion that the exercise of jurisdiction
was fair, 68 the Court then held that California's assertion of juris-
diction was violative of due process. The Court did not reassert
the Hanson standard as a limitation on state court jurisdiction in
support actions, but simply demonstrated that the California
Supreme Court's conclusion that the standard had been satisfied
was incorrect.
The Kulko opinion might even be viewed as refining the Han-
son language to reflect further indicia of fairness. The Court
twice emphasized the applicability of its earlier opinion in Shaffer
rum's choice of law. A. VON MEHRAN & D. TRAUTMAN, THE LAw OF MULTISTATE
PROBLEMS 1342 (1965). Acceptance of this view also compels the conclusion that
the Court never intended its purposeful availment language to be applied literally
in dissimilar situations.
163. 436 U.S. 84 (1978).
164. With the exception of Kulko, all of the Supreme Court's significant in per-
sonam jurisdiction decisions have involved corporate defendants or arm's-length
transactions between individuals. See cases cited note 36 supra.
165. See text accompanying notes 116-21 supra.
166. See note 144 supra.
167. "A father who agrees, in the interests of family harmony and his children's
preferences, to allow them to spend more time in California than was required
under a separation agreement can hardly be said to have 'purposefully availed
himself of the 'benefits and protections' of California's laws." 436 U.S. at 94.
168. Id. at 97-98.
v. Heitner,169 in which the Court had stressed the importance of a
defendant's ability to foresee a potential suit in the forum.170 It
has been argued that Kulko thus effected an alteration in the per-
ceived content of the Hanson standard to embody a concept of
"fair notice" rather than literal purposefulness.'17
This seems reasonable in light of the Court's acknowledgement
that the dominant feature of due process analysis is flexibility.172
After all, the underlying constitutional standard is one of "fair
play and substantial justice," 7 3 and an inelastic application of
any Supreme Court language might occasionally make fairness
difficult to achieve. There is certainly no explicit constitutional
mandate for a "purposeful act" or "personal benefit" in the sparse
text of the fourteenth amendment's due process clause. If such
terms have constitutional significance, their value must lie in
their flexible employment as standards by which to measure the
reasonableness of exercising jurisdiction, once the defendant's
contacts with the state have been enumerated and qualitatively
examined. Indeed, words like "due process" and "liberty" may
only have enduring vitality if they reflect contemporary percep-
tions of their meanings.174 Thus, while technological and com-
mercial realities may justify a strict application of the Hanson
"purposeful availment" language to a suit against a corporate de-
fendant engaged in multi-state business activities, the enhanced
flexibility required in domestic relations litigation should fore-
close that approach in spousal and child support suits.
169. 433 U.S. 186 (1977).
170. This single act is surely not one that a reasonable parent would expect
to result in the substantial financial burden and personal strain of litigat-
ing a child support suit in a forum 3,000 miles away, and we therefore see
no basis on which it could be said that appellant could reasonably have
anticipated being "haled before a [California] court," Shaffer v. Heit-
ne°r.. 
* *
436 U.S. at 97-98 (emphasis added). See also notes 23-25 and accompanying text
supra.
171. See Woods, Pennoyer's Demise: Personal Jurisdiction After Shaffer and
Kulko and a Modest Prediction Regarding World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v.
Woodson, 20 Aiz. I. RE V. 863, 888 (1978). Other commentators have suggested
that the Hanson "purposeful availment" language can best be explained in terms
of a desire by the Court to emphasize foreseeability as an element of fairness. See,
e.g., Casad, Long Arm and Convenient Forum, 20 KAN. L. REV. 1, 11 (1971).
172. See text accompanying note 137 supra.
173. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945).
174. As Chief Justice Marshall noted in McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4
Wheat.) 316, 415 (1819), the Constitution is an inherently flexible instrument, "in-
tended to endure for ages to come, and, consequently, to be adapted to the various
crises of human affairs." See also Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 387
(1821) ("a constitution is framed for ages to come, and is designed to approach im-
mortality as nearly as human institutions can"); Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S.
(1 Wheat.) 304, 326-27 (1816) (Constitution written in general terms to enable it to
be dynamic and adapt to the future).
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Unfortunately, California courts have recently felt compelled to
apply Hanson rigidly to familial support actions. 7 5 This approach
should be abandoned in favor of a more pliant, policy-oriented
analysis, with Hanson interpreted to reflect desirable, but not
mandatory purposefulness and foreseeability. Of course, this
does not mean that the test should be discarded entirely. The
"give and take" concept underlying the purposeful availment
standard conforms easily to popular notions of what is fair or rea-
sonable. Indeed, the purposefulness of the defendant's conduct
should always be considered. The courts should be suspicious of
the fairness of exercising jurisdiction over a nonresident in any
case where he or she has not engaged in some beneficial, pur-
poseful activity connected to the forum. But the test should not
be rigidly applied.
Policy Considerations
California courts have not yet adopted a policy-oriented ap-
proach to long-arm jurisdiction in familial support suits. Explicit
discussions of matters of policy have been infrequent. The opin-
ions in Titus v. Superior Court176 and Judd v. Superior Court177
are exceptions. Titus held that visits from a nonresident parent
to his child in California were insufficient contacts with the state
to justify exercising personal jurisdiction over the parent for sup-
port. 7 8 In reaching its conclusion, the court emphasized that it
was "a strong policy of [the] law to encourage the visitation of
children with their parents."'17 9 Similarly, the Judd court struck
down an effort to base personal jurisdiction on correspondence
from an absent father to his children in California, noting that "it
should be a matter of strong public policy to encourage the pay-
ment of support and communication between a natural father and
his children, not to discourage the same by subjecting the father
to the expense and inconvenience of relitigating this matter of
support in our state."'180 More recently, some California courts
175. See, e.g., Kulko v. Superior Court, 19 Cal. 3d 514, 564 P.2d 353, 138 Cal. Rptr.
586 (1977), rev'd, 436 U.S. 84 (1978); In re Marriage of Lontos, 89 Cal. App. 3d 61, 152
Cal. Rptr. 271 (1979); Hoerler v. Superior Court, 85 Cal. App. 3d 533, 149 Cal. Rptr.
569 (1978).
176. 23 Cal. App. 3d 792, 100 Cal. Rptr. 477 (1972).
177. 60 Cal. App. 3d 38, 131 Cal. Rptr. 246 (1976).
178. See text accompanying notes 89-100 supra.
179. 23 Cal. App. 3d at 803, 100 Cal. Rptr. at 485.
180. 60 Cal. App. 3d at 45, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 249-50.
have repeated language from the United States Supreme Court's
opinion in Kulko to the effect that the state has substantial inter-
ests in protecting resident children and in facilitating child sup-
port actions on their behalf.181
Collectively, these cases evidence some degree of judicial
awareness of the special considerations of policy underlying juris-
dictional issues in support litigation. Nevertheless, California's
current approach-marked by reliance on bases for jurisdiction
developed for other types of suits and a strict application of the
Hanson "purposeful availment" standard-fails to adequately re-
flect these policies. The Hanson standard is essentially restric-
tive, while the relevant policy considerations suggest that
jurisdiction should be expanded. 8 2 Moreover, the traditional ba-
ses for jurisdiction relied on by California's courts emphasize fac-
tors which are largely irrelevant to questions of jurisdictional
reasonableness in support suits.183
Hoerler v. Superior Court184 provides perhaps the most striking
example of the effect of California's failure to properly integrate
considerations of policy into a unified jurisdictional approach.
The Hoerlers were married and had children in California.185
They lived there for fourteen years, before leaving briefly for
Washington, where they were divorced. 18 6 Mr. Hoerler then took
up residence in Washington and Mrs. Hoerler returned to Califor-
nia, where she brought suit. 8 7 In an astonishing decision, the
court held that jurisdiction could not be invoked over Mr. Hoerler
in California, apparently because the Hanson "purposeful avail-
ment" test had somehow not been satisfied.188
The court's only reference to policy was an unadorned quota-
tion from the Supreme Court's opinion in Kulko.
"It cannot be disputed that California has substantial interests in pro-
tecting resident children and in facilitating child-support actions on behalf
of those children. But these interests simply do not make California a
'fair forum'. . . in which to require appellant, who derives no personal or
commercial benefit from his child's presence in California and who lacks
any other relevant contact with the State, either to defend a child-support
181. See Bartlett v. Superior Court, 86 Cal. App. 3d 72, 77, 150 Cal. Rptr. 25, 28
(1978); Hoerler v. Superior Court, 85 Cal. App. 3d 533, 535, 149 Cal. Rptr. 569, 570
(1978) (quoting Kulko v. Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84, 100 (1978)). Cf. In re Mar-
riage of Lontos, 89 Cal. App. 3d 61, 72, 152 Cal. Rptr. 271, 278 (1979): "California has
a substantial and continuing interest in the protection of its resident children and
to facilitate child support actions on behalf of those children."
182. See text accompanying notes 39-81 supra.
183. See text accompanying notes 122-25 supra.
184. 85 Cal. App. 3d 533, 149 Cal. Rptr. 569 (1978).
185. Id. at 534, 149 Cal. Rptr. at 570.
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. See id. at 535, 149 Cal. Rptr. at 570.
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suit or to suffer liability by default."1 8 9
The court did not mention the migratory American life style,190
the special vulnerability of children,191 or the jurisdictional signifi-
cance of the intimate parent-child relationship.192 It did not dis-
cuss the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act193 or
California's interest in protecting its judicial system from forum
shopping. 94 It offered no rationale for its conclusion that the
Hanson test, upon which it strongly relied,19 5 had not been satis-
fied. Indeed, the opinion is remarkably devoid of analysis alto-
gether. And, unless the court rested its decision on facts not
given in the opinion,' 96 it reached an incorrect result. The con-
tacts Mr. Hoerler acquired with California during fourteen years
of family life there should easily have supported a grant of limited
jurisdiction to California's courts to try causes of action arising
from the family relationship.
Hoerler demonstrates how California's failure to integrate con-
siderations of policy into a unified jurisdictional approach for use
in support suits has improperly limited the reach of the state's
long-arm statute. Results like that reached in Hoerler could be
avoided if California were to adopt a new basis for jurisdiction
specifically tailored to spousal and child support suits. Applica-
tion of this basis should be part of a flexible due process standard
encompassing explicit policy analysis. Such an approach would
reflect more adequately the full panoply of interests that are rele-
vant to determinations of the constitutionality of exercising juris-
diction over nonresidents for support.
189. Id. (quoting Kulko v. Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84, 100-01 (1978)).
190. See text accompanying notes 42-47 supra.
191. See text accompanying notes 48-50 supra.
192. See text accompanying notes 51-54 supra.
193. See text accompanying notes 64-76 supra.
194. See text accompanying notes 61-63 supra.
195. The court stated that "[tihe question before us is ... whether 'petitioner
purposefully availed himself of the privilege of conducting business in California
or of the benefits and protections of California laws . . . [or] anticipated that he
would derive any economic benefit [here] as a result of his [act outside Califor-
nia] . .. .'" 85 Cal. App. 3d at 535, 149 Cal. Rptr. at 570.
196. It is possible that factors not enumerated in the opinion contributed to the
court's decision. The court did not say who had custody of the children, nor did it
state how much time had elapsed between Mrs. Hoerler's return to California and
the filing of the suit. If, for example, several years had passed, was the court influ-
enced by a notion that there should be some temporal limitation on contact effi-
cacy? The court was silent on the question, and there is nothing in the opinion to
indicate which other extraneous factors (if any) may have influenced its decision.
A NEW BASIS FOR JURISDICTION
Ideally, a basis for jurisdiction should be policy-reflective.
Thus, a jurisdictional basis designed for use in domestic relations
suits should provide the courts with a means of expanding juris-
diction consistent with the requirements of due process. 97 A ju-
risdictional basis should also afford predictability and consistency
to decisions grounded upon it.
The bases for jurisdiction relied on by California courts in sup-
port litigation to date have fallen somewhat short of these goals.
Neither the "doing an act in the state" basis nor the "causing an
effect in the state" basis implicates the policies underlying sup-
port suits. Consequently, their use artificially limits the reach of
California's long-arm statute in support litigation. California
might more profitably utilize a "familial relationship" test for ju-
risdiction in spousal and child support suits. For example, the
state might assert personal jurisdiction over a nonresident who
maintained a familial relationship with a person resident in the
state at (1) the time the cause of action arose and (2) the time the
suit was commenced. Of course, jurisdiction under this test
should be limited to the determination of rights and liabilities
flowing from the family relationship.
This approach is premised on the presumption that a provider
should be subject to the jurisdiction of the courts of his family's
domicile whenever he repudiates an existing support obliga-
tion.198 The term "familial relationship" is meant to include both
the parent-child and interspousal relationships. The requirement
of plaintiff residence at the time the cause of action arises is
designed to ensure foreseeability of suit in the forum on the part
of the defendant. 99 The requirement of plaintiff residence at the
time of suit is designed to accommodate possible state inter-
ests.200
197. The policies underlying familial support suits suggest that, in general, ex-
panded assertions of jurisdiction in these cases are desirable. See text accompa-
nying notes 39-81 supra.
198. Such an approach seems altogether reasonable in light of the policies dis-
cussed in the text accompanying notes 39-81 supra. See also In re Marriage of
Lontos, 89 Cal. App. 3d 61, 152 Cal. Rptr. 271 (1979), discussed in the text accompa-
nying notes 126-35 supra.
199. See Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 216 (1977). See also Kulko v. Superior
Court, 436 U.S. 84, 97-98 (1978); notes 23-25 and accompanying text supra.
200. See World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 100 S. Ct. 559, 564 (1980);
Kulko v. Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84, 92 (1978); McGee v. International Life Ins.
Co., 355 U.S. 220, 222-24 (1957); Travelers Health Ass'n v. Virginia, 339 U.S. 643, 648-
49 (1950). See also Neil v. Ridner, 153 Ind. App. 149, 286 N.E.2d 427 (1972);
Poindexter v. Willis, 23 Ohio Misc. 199, 51 Ohio Op. 2d 157, 256 N.E.2d 254 (1970);
Van Wagenberg v. Van Wagenberg, 241 Md. 154, 215 A.2d 812, cert. denied, 385 U.S.
833 (1966); text accompanying notes 58-63 supra.
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The utility and constitutionality of this "familial relationship"
basis can be demonstrated by applying it to three hypothetical
fact situations. In the first situation, Husband (H) and Wife (W)
are a married couple living in California. They have two children
born in the state. Following a breakdown of the marriage, H
moves to state X. W now sues for divorce, alimony, and child
support in California.
Personal jurisdiction would clearly be available under the "fa-
milial relationship" basis. W and the children were residents of
California both at the time the cause of action for support arose
(upon H's desertion of his family) and at the time of filing suit.
The obligation of support is one flowing from the family relation-
ship.
Constitutionally, there can be little doubt that H's contacts with
California are sufficient to satisfy the fundamental fairness stan-
dard of International Shoe.201 The aggregate of contacts which
would normally be acquired while California was the marital
domicile should easily support a limited jurisdiction to determine
any rights and liabilities arising from the marital relation. Addi-
tionally, H would have had reason to foresee a suit in California
since California was the situs of the family relationship and W
and the children had remained there. The foreseeability language
of Shaffer would therefore be satisfied.2 02
Moreover, California's strong interest in providing a means of
redress for its residents would be accommodated by exercising ju-
risdiction over H. Even the Hanson "purposeful availment" test
would be satisfied, by virtue of H's initial establishment of Cali-
fornia as the marital domicile, thus nurturing his family relation-
ship under California laws.2 03
That was an example of a situation in which jurisdiction obvi-
ously would lie under the "familial relationship" basis. The fol-
lowing hypothetical presents a situation in which jurisdiction just
as obviously would not lie. Suppose H and W are a married
couple living in state X. They have two children born in that
state. When the marriage breaks down, they obtain a divorce in
state X, the decree providing that W is to have custody and H is
201. See text accompanying notes 11-13 supra.
202. See notes 23-25 and accompanying text supra. Indeed, it is difficult to con-
ceive of a situation in which suit in a foreign state would be more foreseeable.
203. This is not to say, of course, that the Hanson test must be satisfied. See
text accompanying notes 136-75 supra.
to pay child support and alimony. W and the children then move
to California. Thereafter, H makes payments as required by the
X decree. He has no other contacts with California. Subse-
quently, W sues in California to domesticate the X judgment and
to increase H's support obligation.20 4
Personal jurisdiction over H would not lie under the proposed
"familial relationship" basis. Although W and the children were
California residents at the time suit was brought, they were not
California residents when the cause of action for support arose
(upon divorce in state X).
Again, this result is constitutionally proper. It would be exceed-
ingly difficult to reconcile jurisdiction over H in this situation with
the "fair play and substantial justice" standard of International
Shoe.205 H's only contacts with California (the presence of his
ex-wife and children and the mailing of support payments to
them) were involuntary. W had unilaterally taken the children
with her to California, and H was obligated by law to send regular
support payments to them. Moreover, H had no reason to foresee
a potential suit in California. And the potential for forum shop-
ping by W is obvious. 2 06 Even the state's interest in the welfare
of its residents takes on a diminished importance under these
facts, since W and the children had not been abandoned or left
destitute. H was making his regular support payments as or-
dered.
That was another straightforward situation. The following hy-
pothetical presents a much closer question. Suppose H and W
are once again a married couple living in state X. They have two
children born in the state. Again, they obtain a divorce in state X,
the decree providing that W is to have custody of the children and
H is to pay child support and alimony. W and the children then
move to California. Thereafter, H defaults on his payments and
W brings suit in California.
This time, the "familial relationship" test would provide a basis
for jurisdiction to determine child support, but not to determine
alimony. Both W and the children were residents of California at
the time the cause of action arose (when H defaulted) and at the
time the suit was commenced. H, however, only had a familial re-
lationship with the children at those times. The interspousal
204. This fact situation is similar to that presented to the California Supreme
Court in Kulko v. Superior Court, 19 Cal. 3d 514, 564 P.2d 353, 138 Cal. Rptr. 586
(1977), rev'd, 436 U.S. 84 (1978). See text accompanying notes 107-21 supra.
205. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945). See also
Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940).
206. Compare this fact situation with that presented in Henderson v. Hender-
son, 77 Cal. App. 3d 583, 142 Cal. Rptr. 478 (1978), discussed in note 63 supra.
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bond was terminated by the divorce. Thus, the requirements of
the "familial relationship" basis would be satisfied for the chil-
dren but not for W, and jurisdiction would only lie to determine
child support.
Although this example presents a much closer question than ei-
ther of the first two hypotheticals, the results obtained using the
"familial relationship" basis are once again consistent with the
demands of due process. H gave rise to the cause of action for
support by his own purposeful conduct. His decision to stop
sending payments was made with knowledge of the consequences
that would result in California. Thus, he could not successfully
argue that suit there was unforeseeable. Moreover, forum shop-
ping by W is not a factor because she chose California as her
home before H repudiated his support obligations.207 Accordingly,
given the disparity in resources and mobility between H and the
children and the special significance of the parent-child rela-
tion,208 it seems clear that in an action for child support, the due
process test of reasonableness would be met. Indeed, on broader
policy grounds, it is difficult to justify a contrary result. Not al-
lowing suit in California under these circumstances would en-
courage supporting parents to default on their payments, secure
in the knowledge that the cost and inconvenience to their depen-
dents of bringing suit in a foreign state would insulate them from
liability.
A different result should obtain with respect to spousal support,
however. An alimony suit is very much like any other action in
which the plaintiff seeks a money judgment. Because W stands to
gain by the suit, the pro-defendant due process bias should be op-
erative.209 Additionally, unlike the children, W is not helpless.
And there is no longer any special intimacy between the parties
to lend greater significance to H's contact with California. Thus,
exercising jurisdiction over H in an alimony suit would be unrea-
sonable.210 The results reached using the "familial relationship"
basis again coincide with those mandated by the Constitution.
207. A plaintiffs choice of residence before the cause of action arises cannot
reasonably be construed as an attempt to forum shop. The search for a favorable
court does not normally commence until suit is imminent.
208. See text accompanying notes 48-57 supra.
209. See note 48 and accompanying text supra.
210. See, e.g., text accompanying note 77 supra. But see text accompanying
notes 78-81 supra.
It is worth noting that the "familial relationship" basis expands
jurisdiction, at least in child support suits. Jurisdiction to deter-
mine child support in the last example would be difficult to obtain
under the current California approach. First, the court would
have to strain to fit the facts of the case into one of the presently
recognized bases for jurisdiction. It might be argued, for example,
that H had "caused an effect" in California by failing to make his
support payments. The use of the "causing an effect in the state"
basis in support actions, however, was expressly disapproved by
the Supreme Court in Kulko as designed to meet the needs of
other types of cases and consequently inapposite to domestic re-
lations litigation.21 ' Moreover, even if the court were successful
in molding the jurisdictional facts to fit some other basis for juris-
diction, the current California approach would mandate dismissal
of the suit because the Hanson "purposeful availment" test would
remain unsatisfied.2 12 While H's conduct in cutting off support to
his family was purposeful, he did not thereby avail himself of the
benefits and protection of California laws. Thus, because Califor-
nia applies the Hanson standard in a rigid fashion to alimony and
child support suits, jurisdiction would fail. In contrast, if Califor-
nia were to apply Hanson flexibly, as suggested herein,213 juris-
diction would be upheld.
The "familial relationship" basis for jurisdiction outlined here is
presented as a sample of the kind of test that should be adopted
by California's courts; no claim is made that this particular test
must be adopted. The "familial relationship" basis is only a
model. Further thinking could no doubt improve upon it or per-
haps produce a different, more appropriate standard. The impor-
tant point is that California should develop a policy-reflective
approach keyed to the family relationship which will expand ju-
risdiction in support suits without violating due process.
CONCLUSION
In assessing the constitutionality of asserting jurisdiction over
nonresident defendants in support actions, California's courts
have given inadequate attention to the special considerations of
policy that attach to intrafarnily lawsuits. They have relied, in-
stead, on bases for jurisdiction derived from tort or contract ac-
tions between unrelated individuals,21 4 supplementing their
211. Kulko v. Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84, 96 (1978). See text accompanying
notes 124-25 supra.
212. See text accompanying notes 140-44 supra.
213. See text accompanying notes 145-75 supra.
214. See Kulko v. Superior Court, 19 Cal. 3d 514, 564 P.2d 353, 138 Cal. Rptr. 586
(1977), rev'd, 436 U.S. 84 (1978) ("causing an effect in the state" basis); In re Mar-
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analyses with literal applications of the Hanson "purposeful avail-
ment" standard.215 Consequently, California's courts have failed
to fully exploit the broad mandate given to them by section 410.10
of the Code of Civil Procedure.21 6
This conservative approach should be abandoned in favor of a
more flexible, policy-based method of analysis. California's courts
should adopt a basis for jurisdiction tailored to the dominant fea-
ture of support suits-the family relationship. Whether the courts
adopt the test proposed by this Comment or another one like it is
unimportant. What is important is that the courts adopt an ap-
proach which implements the policies underlying support actions
and expands the scope of personal jurisdiction without running
afoul of International Shoe and its progeny. The use of any "fa-
milial relationship" basis should do this, while affording enhanced
consistency and predictability to jurisdictional decision-making in
this area of the law. California's consequent abandonment of doc-
trines derived from functionally dissimilar cases would be a first
important step toward principled analyses of jurisdictional ques-
tions in spousal and child support suits.
THOMAS CRAIG MUNDELL
riage of Lontos, 89 Cal. App. 3d 61, 152 Cal. Rptr. 271 (1979) ("causing an effect in
the state" basis); Judd v. Superior Court, 60 Cal. App. 3d 38, 131 Cal. Rptr. 246
(1976) ("doing an act in the state" and "causing an effect in the state" bases);
Titus v. Superior Court, 23 Cal. App. 3d 792, 100 Cal. Rptr. 477 (1972) ("doing an act
in the state" and "causing an effect in the state" bases). But cf. Bartlett v. Supe-
rior Court, 86 Cal. App. 3d 72, 150 Cal. Rptr. 25 (1978) ("causing an effect in the
state" basis not applicable to domestic relations suits). See generally text accom-
panying notes 83-135 supra.
215. See Kulko v. Superior Court, 19 Cal. 3d 514, 564 P.2d 353, 138 Cal. Rptr. 586
(1977), rev'd, 436 U.S. 84 (1978); In re Marriage of Lontos, 89 Cal. App. 3d 61, 152
Cal. Rptr. 271 (1979); Hoerler v. Superior Court, 85 Cal. App. 3d 533, 149 Cal. Rptr.
569 (1978).
216. See Hoerler v. Superior Court, 85 Cal. App. 3d 533, 149 Cal. Rptr. 569 (1978);
text accompanying notes 184-96 supra.

